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ABSTRACT
As many as 400,000 people die each year, and a million are injured, by preventable
medical injuries sustained in the U.S. health system. Collection of data to enhance
understanding of how unintended medical injuries happen is an essential part of
harm-reduction strategies. While health system data collection and reporting
processes have improved in recent years, the scope and intractability of the medical
injuries problem demands new efforts. The legal system could contribute valuable
medical injury data to patient safety efforts but current practices largely prevent it. In
medical malpractice claims where parties settle, case information is routinely
protected from disclosure by confidentiality agreements thus any medical injury
information is inaccessible. Parties who litigate may convince a court to seal their
case files, thereby keeping data out of investigator’s reach. Insurers have extensive
claim files, rich with information, but provide access only at their discretion. Most
notably, fewer than 3% of patients who are injured in the health system ever bring a
claim. Therefore, a vast pool of medical injury information lies dormant, never
developed through legal claims. This Note argues that the tort system’s social utility
purpose would be better served if more information about medical harm were
exposed. Though numerous barriers would need to be overcome, data of value to the
health system, and the patients who depend on it, could be extracted from (1) out-ofcourt settlements, (2) sealed court records, (3) medical malpractice insurance claims,
and (4) by stimulating medical malpractice claims to create a larger data pool.
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I. Introduction
It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.1
–Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

A

na Jimenez-Salgado had a bilateral mastectomy to treat breast
cancer but, after the surgery, she discovered she had never had
cancer.2 She filed a successful lawsuit.3
The newborn twins of actor Dennis Quaid and his wife received, in
error, one thousand times the ordered dose of the blood thinner
heparin.4 The babies survived and their parents settled a lawsuit with
the hospital.5
While Rebecca Fielding waited two hours for an emergency
Caesarean section to deliver her son, Enzo, his brain was deprived of
oxygen resulting in cerebral palsy and a seizure disorder.6 The family
received one of the largest medical malpractice judgments in Maryland
history.7
These cases demonstrate the intersection of two complex entities,
the U.S. health and legal systems. It is this nexus, where a medical
injury8 becomes a medical malpractice claim, that is the focus of this
Note.
1
2

3
4

5

6

7
8

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 7 (1892).
Letter from John F. Krattli, Senior Assistant Cnty. Counsel, Cnty. of L. A., to
Sachi A. Hamai, Exec. Officer, L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Re: Ana JiminezSalgado v. Cnty. of Los Angeles (July 26, 2010), http://file.lacounty.gov
/bos/supdocs/56035.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PSR-8CE5].
Id.
Scott Hensley, Dennis Quaid Acts on Medical Errors, WSJ BLOGS (Mar. 28,
2008, 10:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/03/28/dennis-quaid-acts-onmedical-errors [http://perma.cc/N45T-YKUC].
Dennis Quaid Settles with Hospital on Twins Overdose, REUTERS (Dec. 16,
2008, 3:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/16/us-quaididUSTRE4BF6S920081216 [http://perma.cc/B5G5-BXCK].
Yvonne Wenger & Kevin Rector, Jury Awards Waverly Family $55 Million in
Hopkins Malpractice Case, BALTIMORE SUN, June 26, 2012, http://articles.
baltimoresun.com/2012-06-26/health/bs-md-ci-malpractice-award-20120626_1_
malpractice-awards-in-state-history-gary-stephenson [http://perma.cc/4NGCFUFW].
Id.
A word about words: The language used to describe medical errors has grown
cumbersome. Healthcare providers sometimes make mistakes (errors). Those
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The bombshell. The health system, like many patients entrusted to
its care, is afflicted. Medical errors were the focus of the Institute of
Medicine’s 1999 “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System.”9
The book “dropped a bombshell” by reporting that up to 98,000 people
die each year in U.S. hospitals due to medical mistakes. 10 With the
medical error problem quantified and squarely in the public eye, the
health system launched system-wide patient safety improvement
efforts. At the foundation of these efforts to reduce harm is
comprehensive collection and analysis of data.11 Valid data is required
to help researchers, healthcare providers, and other stakeholders grasp
how errors occur so remedies can be designed to reduce them, as well
as to measure how effective solutions are.12
Learning from malpractice litigation. But despite extensive
efforts within the health system to reduce medical errors and injuries,

9

10

11

12

errors may result in a physical harm (an injury) but not all errors cause injuries.
The patient safety literature now calls errors that result in harm “preventable
adverse events” but this Note will use “medical injury.” Patients do experience
harm from medical care even in the absence of errors. For example, patients
experience pain following surgery–an expected outcome. Patients may also
experience a side effect from treatment. For example, an intended outcome of
cold medications is relief of nasal congestion. A side effect of the medication
may be drowsiness. The side effect was not caused by an error and is not an
injury. This Note uses “medical negligence” and “medical malpractice”
interchangeably to refer to substandard care that results in an injury even though
not all instances of negligent care result in an injury. This Note refers to
“claims” instead of “lawsuits” because not all claims become lawsuits.
Institute of Medicine, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
26 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN] (estimating
between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year from preventable medical
errors).
Marshall Allen, How Many Die From Medical Mistakes in U.S. Hospitals?,
PROPUBLICA (Sep. 19, 2013, 10:03 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article
/how-many-die-from-medical-mistakes-in-us-hospitals [http://perma.cc/3KRFQDY6].
TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 9, at 4 (“Much can be learned from the analysis
of errors. All adverse events resulting in serious injury or death should be
evaluated to assess whether improvements in the delivery system can be made to
reduce the likelihood of similar events occurring in the future”).
Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1226 (2013) (citing TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 9, at 5-15
(summarizing the Institute of Medicine’s recommendations for reducing medical
error in U.S. hospitals)).
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progress has been “sluggish.” 13 Since gathering data is vital to
progress, the health system could benefit by seeking new sources of
data from an entity sometimes perceived as the “enemy”—the legal
system.
Medical malpractice litigation reveals information.14 It can help a
hospital (or other healthcare organization) understand where it is prone
to problems as well as to guide change.15 Medical malpractice claims16
can reveal medical errors not reported through other means, and the
information developed through discovery and trial is often more
complete than what appears in medical records alone. 17 In fact,
anesthesia malpractice claims studies are credited with stimulating
change that reduced the danger of receiving anesthesia.18
But, much malpractice data is not accessible. Most medical
malpractice information remains beyond the reach of health care
leaders, researchers, providers, and others because (1) information is
often sealed in court records or settlements with non-disclosure
provisions, (2) insurance carriers provide limited access to data in
malpractice claim records, and (3) only about 3% of medical injury
cases are ever litigated so no records are generated in most instances.19
These barriers to producing medical injury data could be overcome.
13

14
15
16

17
18

19

Robert Wachter, The ‘Must Do’ List: Certain Patient Safety Rules Should Not be
Elective, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, (Aug. 20, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org
/blog/2015/08/20/the-must-do-list-certain-patient-safety-rules-should-not-beelective [http://perma.cc/FV9T-EXKP].
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1246.
Id. at 1266.
This Note uses the term “claim” to describe a demand for compensation made to
a health care provider’s insurer by a claimant who alleges negligent medical
treatment resulting in an injury. After a claim is filed, the insurer may settle the
case, negotiate over the compensation amount or refuse to compensate the
claimant. If the parties do not arrive at a resolution, and the claimant desires to
pursue the case, the claimant’s lawyer may file a lawsuit. Not all claims ripen
into lawsuits; they can be abandoned prior to proceeding to the court system.
Thomas H. Cohen & Kristen A. Hughes, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims
in Seven States, 2000-2004, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.
SPECIAL REPORT (Mar. 2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmicss
04.pdf[http://perma.cc/52EA-VJKF].
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1297.
George J. Annas, The Patient’s Right to Safety–Improving the Quality of Care
through Litigation against Hospitals, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2065 (2006).
See infra part III for a description of the inaccessibility of medical malpractice
insurance data.
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Less litigation secrecy would increase data availability. When
malpractice cases are settled, payment to the claimant is generally
conditioned on a nondisclosure agreement 20 that prohibits injured
parties from discussing their case.21 Additionally, parties engaged in
malpractice litigation can request judicial sealing of court records,
thereby barring access.22
Placing limits on nondisclosure agreements in settlements, or on a
court’s ability to seal records, is controversial and impassioned
advocates exist on both sides of the debate. Those who support
confidentiality argue it is vital to the viability of the courts23 and that
lack of confidentiality would impinge on litigants’ ability to resolve
disputes with minimal intrusion from external forces. 24 In turn, if
settlement were less attractive, limited court resources would be
overwhelmed. 25 Further, some secrecy advocates view the civil
litigation system solely as a forum for private parties to resolve private
disputes—not as a tool of social justice.26
Advocates of greater transparency (“sunshine”) argue that
litigation records should not be sealed if they contain information that
adversely affects public health and safety. 27 They contend that, in
cases like the Agent Orange settlement, the exploding Firestone tires
settlement, and the Johns-Manville asbestos settlement, danger to the
public would have been revealed sooner, and many lives saved, if
documents had not been sealed.28
20

21

22

23

24

25

26
27

28

A non-disclosure agreement is also referred to as a confidentiality clause or
agreement.
William M. Sage et al., Use of Nondisclosure Agreements in Medical
Malpractice Settlements by a Large Academic Health Care System, 175 JAMA
INTERN. MED. 1130, 1131 (2015).
Joseph W. Doherty et al. eds., CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S.
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM xvii (2012).
David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-Sanctioned Secrecy and the
Exigency of National Reform, 53 DUKE L.J. 807, 809 (2003).
Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REv. 427, 432 (1991).
Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 2, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/02/us/judges-seek-toban-secret-settlements-in-south-carolina.html [http://perma.cc/YL47-ACZ3].
Miller, supra note 24, at 441.
Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don’t Know Can Kill You!, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 237, 240 (2004).
Sanson, supra note 23, at 813.
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More access to insurance claims data would uncover problems.
Liability insurance, including medical liability insurance, is a cog in
the civil justice system as well as a window through which to observe
the system.”29 Malpractice insurance claims data can be used to detect
problematic clinical processes and devise strategies to reduce
negligence.30 However, the process for obtaining access to insurance
data is time-consuming and uncertain.31
More litigation would generate more data. The biggest barrier to
extracting data from the legal system to inform health system change
is that most is merely “potential” data. About 97% of patients who
experience a medical injury do not pursue a legal remedy.32 Therefore,
there are no records from which to extract information, sealed or
otherwise, in the great majority of medical injury cases.
The social utility of malpractice litigation. Legal scholars have
debated the aims of tort law and most agree on two: (1) compensation
for injured parties and (2) deterrence of undesired behavior. 33 This
Note adopts the perspective that these aims are subsumed under social
utility, a broader societal goal. Social utility incorporates justice to the
individual as a goal, but its primary concern is rules that work toward
the good of society.34
In the 1960s, common law torts started to serve a quasi-regulatory
and public law function in resolving intractable social problems where
regulation or criminal law failed.35 Medical injuries have proved to be
just such an intractable social problem. Therefore, the tort system, as
purveyor of social justice, has a valid and appropriate role to play in
advancing the goal of reducing the epidemic of patient injuries.36
29

30

31
32
33
34
35
36

Tom Baker, Transparency through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion,
in CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 185
(Joseph W. Doherty et al. eds., 2012).
Richard Kravitz et al., Malpractice Claims Data as a Quality Improvement
Tool: I. Epidemiology of Error in Four Specialties, 266 JAMA 2087, 2087
(1991).
Baker, supra note 29, at 186.
See infra part II for a description of medical malpractice litigation rates.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (2000).
Id.
Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 522 (2011).
The Ford Explorer/exploding Firestone tires case illustrates how tort law serves
a larger purpose beyond the plaintiff and defendant. The National Highway
Traffic Administration (NHTSA) acted only after trial lawyers used discovery to
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The Argument. Due to the extent of harm befalling patients,
efforts should be made to gather data that enhances understanding of
why medical injuries occur—including excavating data from medical
injury claims and lawsuits. This Note argues that (1) secrecy in out-ofcourt settlements and judicial records should be minimized when
public health risks are involved; 2) greater access to medical
malpractice insurance claims data would illuminate medical injury
problems, and 3) the pool of untapped medical injury data in dormant
claims—the 97% that are never brought–could be accessible if more
claims are brought. These proposals, of course, will meet resistance.
But each day, 600 to 1200 people die as a result of harm they
encounter in the health system37 and over 2700 are injured.38
The remainder of this Note proceeds as follows. Part II—The
Health System Grapples with the Medical Injury Epidemic—describes
the complexity of U.S. health services and the extent of medical
injuries. Part III—How the Legal System Deals with Medical
Malpractice—describes the tort of medical malpractice and barriers in
the legal system that prevent access to medical harm data. Part IV—
Medical Malpractice Litigation Has Improved Patient Safety—
describes examples of how medical malpractice litigation has
improved patient safety. Part V—Recommendations for Extracting
Malpractice Data from the Legal System—identifies strategies for
increasing the access to medical injury data in the legal system. Part
VI—Conclusions—summarizes key elements in the Note.

37

38

uncover that Firestone tires on Explorers had caused hundreds of rollover
accidents due to tread separation. See id. at 535-36.
John T. James, A New, Evidence-based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated
with Hospital Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAF. 122, 122 (2013).
Lucian L. Leape, Preventing Medical Accidents: Is “Systems Analysis” The
Answer?, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 146 (2001).
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II. THE HEALTH SYSTEM GRAPPLES WITH MEDICAL INJURIES
[I]t does not matter whether the deaths of 100,000,
200,000, or 400,000 Americans each year are
associated with preventable adverse events in hospitals.
Any of the estimates demands assertive action on the
part of providers, legislators and people who will one
day become patients.39
–Dr. John T. James
A. Scope of U.S. Health System Services
The U.S. health system provides an enormous volume of services
annually via 35 million inpatient hospital stays, 51 million medical
procedures, 126 million clinic visits, and 136 million emergency
department visits.40 Health services are delivered in more than 5,600
hospitals, 41 5,300 ambulatory surgery centers, 42 and 15,400 nursing
care facilities.43 Because of the sophisticated nature of care provided in
the American “medical-industrial complex,” 44 and the number of
39
40

41

42

43

44

James, supra note 37, at 127.
Hospital Utilization (in Non-Federal Short-Stay Hospitals), CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/hospital.htm [http://perma.cc/MLL6-KMTT]. These numbers include
only non-federal healthcare so care provided in U.S. military, veteran’s hospitals
and Bureau of Prisons entities are not reflected. Id.
Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION (2015),
http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml [http://perma.
cc/D8BY-7WVT].
Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, Ambulatory Surgical Center
Services, ch. 3 115 MEDPAC (March 2015), http://www.medpac.gov/
documents/reports/chapter-5-ambulatory-surgical-center-services-(march-2015report).pdf?sfvrsn=0 [http://perma.cc/YLP6-7NRE].
Total Number of Certified Nursing Facilities, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
(2015), http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/number-of-nursing-facilities [http://
perma. cc/HKQ4-F3A9].
The term “medical-industrial complex” is a play on President Dwight
Eisenhower’s use of “military-industrial complex”—language he used as a
caution to the American people that the military would distort social policy
because of its bent toward producing more elaborate and expensive military
equipment. See Edward Goldsmith, The Medical Industrial Complex (June 1,
1990), http://www.edwardgoldsmith.org/53/the-medical-industrial-complex
[http://perma.cc/DMF3-GFXV]. Similarly, “medical industrial complex” has
been used to refer to the increasing expense and technological complexity of the
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people involved with diverse backgrounds and training, healthcare is
prone to errors, especially when there is little time to react to
unexpected events.45 Early medical error studies focused on hospitals,
but medical misadventures occur in all clinical settings, including
outpatient clinics, nursing facilities, and patient’s homes.46
B. Scope of Medical Injuries: “Erring” the Health System’s
Dirty Laundry
When “To Err is Human” reported that up to 98,000 people die in
U.S. hospitals each year due to avoidable medical error, a media
frenzy erupted.47 The book received front-page coverage in The New
York Times, The Washington Post, and other major papers as well as
television news coverage. 48 Congressional hearings ensued as
government agencies, healthcare groups, healthcare accrediting
organizations, and insurers demanded change. 49 But patient safety
experts now say it’s time to stop citing the Institute of Medicine’s
figure of 98,000 annual deaths.50 Why? Because it’s too conservative.
A 2013 study found that, based on more recent data, 210,000 to
400,000 deaths result from preventable harm each year in hospitals.51
This pegs medical error as the third leading cause of death in the
U.S.52

45

46
47

48
49
50

51
52

health system. See Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex,
303 NEW ENG. J. MED 963 (1980).
Molla S. Donaldson, An Overview of To Err is Human: Re-emphasizing the
Message of Patient Safety, in PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCEBASED HANDBOOK FOR NURSES ch. 3 1 (Ronda G. Hughes ed., 2008),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2673 [http://perma.cc/DK5P-9TYL].
Id.
Susan Dentzer, Media Mistakes in Coverage of the Institute of Medicine’s
Report, 6 EFFECTIVE CLINICAL PRACTICE (Nov./Dec. 2000), http://ecp.
acponline .org/novdec00/dentzer.htm [http://perma.cc/C9QW-ANRB].
Id.
Donaldson, supra note 45.
Allen, supra note 10 (describing the experts who have confidence in James’ data
including Dr. Lucian Leape, a Harvard physician who is considered the “father
of patient safety.” Leape served on the Institute of Medicine Committee
responsible for writing “TO ERR IS HUMAN.”).
James, supra note 37, at 122.
Cheryl Clark, Medical Errors Third Leading Cause of Death, Senators Told,
HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (July 14, 2014), http://healthleadersmedia.com/
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Fatalities are only part of the problem. More than a million people
are injured each year by medical treatments.53 The economic impact
associated with these preventable adverse events was $17 billion for
one year as measured by healthcare expenses, lost income, lost
household production, and disability costs.54
C. Patient Safety Efforts—and Their Limits
A flourish of efforts to diminish medical injuries was implemented
after the 1999 publication of “To Err is Human.” The tactics included
changing culture within healthcare organizations by adopting
approaches used in “high reliability” organizations that are relatively
mistake-free, like nuclear power plants and air traffic control.55
The new approaches joined those used for many years like hospital
“morbidity and mortality” conferences, an educational forum where
physicians discuss clinical problems. 56 Internal reporting systems
(“incident reports”), a staple in hospitals for decades, are used to
identify errors and near-errors. Incident reports have limited usefulness
because they are voluntary, 57 providers are known not to report all
errors (they “under-report”),58 and errors rates cannot be derived from

53

54

55
56

57

content.cfm?content_id=306564&page=1&topic=QUA [http://perma.cc/F2RQZT44].
Leape, supra note 38, at 146. Dr. Leape, a visionary leader in the patient safety
field, contended that the million injuries figure was an underestimate–in 2001.
Id.
Jill Van Den Bos et al., The $17.1 Billion Problem: The Annual Cost of
Measurable Medical Errors, 30 HEALTH AFF. 596 (2011) (describing how
researchers used actuarial techniques to measure the frequency and costs of
measurable medical errors identified in nearly nine years of insurance claims
data. The most common errors were pressure ulcers (bed sores), post-operative
infections, and post-laminectomy syndrome, and persistent pain following back
surgery).
ROBERT M. WACHTER, UNDERSTANDING PATIENT SAFETY 255 (2012).
See e.g., ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN
IMPERFECT SCIENCE 57-70 (2002) (describing the process used in morbidity and
mortality conferences to learn from patients’ cases).
See WACHTER, supra note 55, at 234-35 (describing that errors are so common
that a report made on each error would capsize the system; for example, an
average intensive care unit patient experiences 1.7 errors per day in their care
and an average hospitalized patient has one medication error each day.).
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them.59 Since both morbidity and mortality conferences and incident
reports are confidential internal activities, what one facility uncovers
remains protected within that organization.
Hospitals also use patient chart reviews, computerized
surveillance, review of multiple source data (e.g., medical records,
laboratory, pharmacy, and billing), observation of patient care, and
walking rounds on patients-each has weaknesses in detecting and
monitoring patient safety issues.60
Sentinel events, serious errors such as surgery on the wrong limb,
trigger a search for underlying “root” causes of the errors and produce
recommendations to prevent similar errors in the future.61 The Joint
Commission, the quality agency that collects these analyses,
encourages healthcare organizations to report major errors but
reporting data is voluntary and thus this data also has limited value.62
Significant personnel and financial resources have been invested to
improve patient safety and nearly all healthcare organizations have

58

59

60

61
62

David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 N. ENG. J. MED. 283, 287
(2004) (describing that a feature of physician’s unwillingness to participate in
certain patient safety activities is manifested by underreporting to adverse-event
reporting systems).
See WACHTER, supra note 55, at 235. If reports of medication errors were to
drop from one month to the next in a hospital for example, there is no way to
know if the actual number of errors dropped or the voluntary reports decreased.
Id.
Fang Sun, Monitoring Patient Safety Problems, AHRQ, No. 211, MAKING
HEALTH CARE SAFER II: AN UPDATED CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE
FOR PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES 2-3 (2013), http://www.ahrq.gov/sites/
default/files/wysiwyg/research/findings/evidence-based-reports/services/quality
/ptsafetyII-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/4Y5E-VV4J].
WACHTER, supra note 55, at 244-45.
Sentinel Event Data, THE JOINT COMMISSION, (2015), http://www.joint
commission.org/assets/1/18/Root_Causes_Event_Type_2004-2Q_2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9AR4-UDWS] (describing that sentinel event reporting to The
Joint Commission is voluntary and since it represents a small proportion of
actual events conclusions should not be drawn from it). The Joint Commission is
an independent, not-for-profit organization that plays a major role in assessing
and setting quality standards in the U.S. health system. It accredits and certifies
nearly 21,000 healthcare organizations and programs in the United States. The
Joint Commission, http://www.jointcommission.org/about_us/about_the_joint_
commission_main.aspx [http://perma.cc/GM3C-RQAG] (last visited Dec. 18,
2015).
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made patient safety a primary strategic priority.63 But progress has not
matched the level of effort and investment, 64 in fact, it has been
described as “sluggish.” 65 Three studies in the decade after the
publication of “To Err is Human” found high rates of preventable
harm continued largely unabated in U.S. hospitals.66
III. MISSING IN ACTION: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DATA
Many liability doctrines shine a light on less than
salutary health care practices.67
–Barry Furrow, J.D.
A. The Tort Liability System
The civil justice system provides opportunity for redress to
individuals harmed in a manner considered compensable through tort
or other civil liability law.68 In American society, tort law is the default
regulator of safety and economic power.69 Distinguished legal scholar
Roscoe Pound described tort law as weighing individual interests in
order to advance social interests. 70 Tort law’s “signature” has been
characterized as its flexibility in enabling consumers to uncover
emerging dangers or risks affecting them and others in society.71
Additionally, Americans use their court systems not just as a
means of resolving disputes, but also to produce information useful to

63

64
65
66
67

68

69

70
71

AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY [hereinafter AHRQ], No.
211, MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER II: AN UPDATED CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES ii, ES-1 (2013).
Id.
Wachter, supra note 13.
AHRQ, supra note 63.
Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation
as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 63 (2011).
Baker, supra note 29, at 185. This Note uses Baker’s definition of the American
civil justice system: the courts, law firms, government legal agencies, the
organized bar, organizations that assist claimants and defendants, and liability
insurance firms. Id.
John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (2005).
Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1943).
Rustad, supra note 35, at 526.
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society. 72 But the civil justice system is increasingly opaque. 73 Less
than five percent of the millions of tort injury claims filed each year
are resolved through public trial; most are settled in private forums
like mediation and arbitration with undisclosed terms. 74 As the
proportion of cases going to trial declines, courts are less able to serve
as “revealers” of societally useful information. 75 Therefore, it’s
necessary to look to other strategies to reveal socially valuable medical
injury information.
B. The Tort of Medical Malpractice
Introduction. Medical malpractice is a form of tort liability with
two prime objectives: (1) to compensate patients who sustain an injury
due to healthcare provider negligence, and (2) to deter providers from
negligent practice. 76 A medical malpractice claim arises when a
plaintiff alleges negligent medical treatment caused an injury.77 In a
medical negligence claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
1) The relationship between the plaintiff/patient and
defendant/healthcare provider gave rise to a duty;
2) The defendant’s care fell below the applicable standard;
3) The plaintiff suffered an injury; and
4) The injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence.78
Other liability doctrines can form the basis of claims, including
informed consent doctrine that recognizes patients’ informational
72

73
74
75
76

77

78

Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing
Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 375, 402 (2006).
Doherty, supra note 22, at ix.
Id.
Goldstein, supra note 72, at 403.
Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for
Reform, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 93, 93 (2011).
Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims in Seven States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., 2000-2004 (March, 2007), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf [http://perma.cc/2NQT-ENW9].
MICHELLE M. MELLO & DAVID M. STUDDERT, The Medical Malpractice
System-Structure and Performance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S.
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 11-12 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006).
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needs, provisions in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA) that mandate stabilizing treatment before a
patient can be transferred to another hospital, and duty to warn.79
A medical malpractice claim may be brought against a nurse,
pharmacist, psychologist, or other health professional but physicians
most frequently face claims.80 Hospitals and other health organizations
may be claimed against and the law in most states permits health
professionals and health facilities to be held jointly and severally
liable.81
Disposal of malpractice claims. A medical malpractice claim can
be disposed of in a settlement prior to or after a lawsuit filing, or when
a lawsuit is closed after a verdict or judgment is reached at trial. 82
Most are resolved outside of courtrooms—only 7.8% of medical
malpractices cases were disposed of by jury or bench trials in 2005.83
C. What Prevents Access to Medical Malpractice Data?
There is a well-known parable involving an elephant and three
blind men.84 Each of the men attempts to describe the entirety of an
elephant through only the small part of the elephant that each feels.
One touches a tusk, one the elephant’s side, and so on. Each “knows”
what an elephant is based on the little they know individually, and
each is right—to a point.
Like the men in the parable, what is now known about medical
harm is only a portion of the problem. More information would
provide a clearer picture of the complexities of medical injuries,
thereby contributing to the development of strategies to improve
patient safety. But three barriers currently prevent this.
Barrier #1: Most injured parties do not bring claims so legal
data does not exist in a form that can be used. In contrast to the
79

80
81
82
83

84

Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation
as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 63 (2011).
MELLO, supra note 78, at 12.
Id. at 12.
DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 77.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., PUB. NO. NCJ 228129, Tort
Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005 14 (Nov. 2009), http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf [http://perma.cc/BVG3-XJQ5] (noting that
2005 is the most recent year data are available from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
An update of the tale would preferably refer to the parties as vision-impaired
and include gender diversity.
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extent of medical malpractice that occurs in the U.S. each year, there is
little litigation in response to it. Tom Baker, an insurance and medical
malpractice expert, explained that, depending on how statistics are
analyzed, there is one medical malpractice lawsuit for every seven to
twenty-five serious medical injuries. 85 In contrast, Baker points out,
nearly everyone injured by a negligent driver files an insurance claim
or lawsuit.86 Baker’s malpractice math rests on highly regarded studies
that bear out his claim. In the 1990 Harvard Medical Practice Study,
researchers reviewed over 30,000 patient records in New York
hospitals. Of the 280 patients identified who had adverse events
caused by medical negligence, eight filed malpractice claims thus
about 97% did not sue.87 When the Harvard researchers replicated the
study in Utah and Colorado, they got the same result: 97% of patients
who suffered a negligent injury did not sue.88 A third study in Chicago
produced consistent findings: less than 4% of injured patients filed
claims.89
Barrier #2: Secrecy in settlements and court records bars
access. Courts can sanction secrecy through protective orders on
discovery materials, by sealing court records, and through
confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements. 90 Alternatively,
parties may settle out of court and a court then has no control over the
agreement. 91 While a court may reserve the right to open a sealed
record or settlement, sealed records and settlements generally remain
permanently closed to all nonparties.92

85
86
87

88

89

90

91
92

TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 23 (2007).
Id.
A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse
Events Due to Negligence-Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 345, 345 (1991).
David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in
Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 250 (2000).
BAKER, supra note 85, at 69. Baker describes one study that indicated about
10% of injured patients filed a lawsuit. However, the 2-3% rate of medical
malpractice claiming appears to be accepted by most experts and scholars. Thus,
this Note will use 3%. Id.
Alison Lothes, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements
and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 435 (2005).
Id.
Sanson, supra note 23, at 808.
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Most civil litigation, including medical malpractice, ends in
settlement.93 When medical malpractice claims are settled, payment to
a plaintiff is generally conditioned on a signed release that includes a
nondisclosure agreement (also referred to as a confidentiality
agreement or a “gag order”).94 Healthcare providers and organizations
have compelling reasons to seek confidential resolution to medical
malpractice claims. Several means are available to shield information
from disclosure.95 Many defendants wish to avoid the embarrassment
of a public trial, are concerned about reputational harm, or prefer the
expediency of a settlement.96 They may believe that public news of a
settlement will trigger other claims against them.97
Confidential, or “secret” settlements related to sexual abuse by
priests, asbestos, tobacco, and silicone breast implants have garnered
significant public attention.98 The term “secret settlement” refers to:
a range of practices that result in a settlement between
disputing parties on terms not subject to public
scrutiny. The secrecy of many settlements is achieved
simply by a private contract between the parties that is
not filed with the court. Some settlement agreements
however, are filed under seal with the court, ensuring
judicial enforcement of the parties’ obligation to
maintain secrecy regarding settlement terms. Judicially
mandated secrecy may extend not only to the terms and
amount of the settlement but also to other court
documents, such as filed discovery papers.99
93
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97
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Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation
as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 76 (2011).
William M. Sage, et al., Use of Nondisclosure Agreements in Medical
Malpractice Settlements by a Large Academic Health Care System, 175 JAMA
INTERN. MED. 1130, 1131 (2015).
Smith, supra note 27, at 240-41.
Hannah V. Meisen-Vehrs, Opening Medical Settlements for the Public Good:
Why Medical Cases Justify Secrecy in Settlement, 87 OR. L. REV. 671, 682
(2008).
Michelle M. Mello & Jeffrey N. Catalano, Should Malpractice Settlements Be
Secret?, 175 JAMA INTERN. MED. 1135, 1135 (2015).
Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and
Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2006).
Id. at 1458.
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Though secrecy in settlement agreements draws criticism, the
majority of states don’t prohibit it. 100 But confidential settlement of
private litigation can be contrary to public interest where harm may
reoccur.101
Medical malpractice settlements are frequently confidential. 102 A
2015 study in a Texas university hospital system found that 89% of
medical malpractice settlement agreements used nondisclosure
agreements.103 All of the agreements in the study prohibited disclosure
of settlement terms, half prohibited disclosure that an agreement had
been reached, and 26% prohibited the claimant from reporting the
matter to regulatory agencies.104
Confidential settlement may encourage rapid resolution, but that is
obtained at the cost of permanently barring access to potentially
valuable information that could improve patient safety and the quality
of care. 105 The Joint Commission contends that secret settlements
deprive injured patients of the opportunity to advocate for change and
deprive healthcare providers of the opportunity to learn from sealed
cases.106
Barrier #3: Limited access to insurance data. The liability
insurance industry has a history of providing certain information to
researchers on a voluntary basis, including some medical liability
closed claims data.107 For example, five malpractice insurers provided
data to Harvard researcher Dr. David Studdert for analysis aimed at
determining the value of closed insurance claims data in patient safety

100
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102
103
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Meisen-Vehrs, supra note 96, at 675.
Sage, supra note 94, at 1133.
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Id. The University of Texas stopped restricting regulatory reporting in
settlement agreements in response to the findings of this study. Id. at 1134.
Health Care at the Crossroads: Strategies for Improving the Medical Liability
System and Preventing Patient Injury, THE JOINT COMMISSION 37 (2005),
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/Medical_Liability.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5S4U-5M5V].
Id.
Baker, supra note 29, at 186. A “closed claim” is one that has been settled or
otherwise disposed of by the insurer, self-insurer, facility or provider. Medical
Professional Liability Closed Claim Reporting Model Law 77-1, NAT’L ASS’N
INS. COMM’RS (Oct. 2008), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-77.pdf.
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efforts. 108 Studdert and colleagues found closed malpractice claims
were a rich source of data describing errors and factors that
contributed to their occurrence.109
Malpractice insurers use their own data to improve patient safety
(they are, after all, highly motivated to minimize malpractice claims
and payouts). For example, in the 1990s when many physicians were
being sued for failure to diagnose breast cancer, CRICO110 found their
insured physicians had no uniform approach to monitoring breast
lumps. 111 The insurance firm developed a standard treatment
algorithm, offered insured physicians who used it an insurance
premium discount, and dramatically reduced litigation.112
However, due to the nature of the insurance industry, there are
limits to what has been provided to researchers, and to what can be
expected.113 Currently, access to medical malpractice insurance data is
provided at the discretion of the insurer and that access is not easy or
certain. 114 Insurers derive competitive advantage by protecting their
data, and they have a significant interest in public policy debates that
could be affected by research derived from their data. 115 Also, a
researcher whose conclusions do not support an insurer’s agenda may
be less likely to obtain access to future data than one whose research is
supportive.116
108

109
110

111

112
113
114
115
116

See David M. Studdert, MIMESPS: Learning from Malpractice Cases, CRICO
CLINICIAN RESOURCES (June 1, 2005), https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/ClinicianResources/Article/2005/MIMESPS-Learning-from-Malpractice-Cases#
[http://perma.cc/Z69D-782V].
Id.
The Controlled Risk Insurance Company is a not-for-profit firm that insures
claims from Harvard-affiliated hospitals. CRICO,
https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/About-CRICO [http://perma.cc/P72H-Q3EQ]
(last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
Darshak Sanghavi, Medical Malpractice: Why is it So Hard for Doctors to
Apologize?, BOSTON GLOBE MAG. 11 (Jan. 27, 2013), https://www.
bostonglobe.com/magazine/2013/01/27/medical-malpractice-why-hard-fordoctors-apologize/c65KIUZraXekMZ8SHlMsQM/story.html [http://perma.cc/
Y4BQ-XEBY].
Id.
Baker, supra note 29, at 186.
Id.
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 187.
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A limitation on the value of closed claims analysis is the data were
collected by the insurer for the purpose of resolving an insurance
claim, not for patient safety research. 117 Additionally, medical
malpractice closed claims data does not reflect information about
claims that are still unresolved.118
American malpractice insurance companies must file two types of
closed claim reports. First, any payment made in satisfaction of a
medical malpractice claim against a healthcare practitioner must be
reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).119 The NPDB
is a nationwide flagging system designed to alert employers such as
hospitals or state licensing bodies to a healthcare provider’s
malpractice record.120 The NPDB has a public use data file, containing
de-identified data, available for researchers, journalists, and others to
analyze patient safety trends. 121 However, the databank does not
contain extensive information regarding the circumstances leading to a
malpractice payment, only certain data mandated by federal law. 122
Some states require insurance providers to report medical malpractice
payments to a state agency. 123 However, the data reported concerns
financial aspects of the claim—not detailed clinical data that would be
of value to patient safety researchers.
Second, medical malpractice payments also must be reported to
state professional licensing agencies that license physicians, nurses,
and others. 124 While professional licensing has a patient safety and
protection function by establishing academic standards and monitoring
117

118

119
120

121
122
123
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Frederick W. Cheney, The American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims
Project, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 552, 553 (1999).
American Academy of Actuaries, Important Considerations When Analyzing
Medical Malpractice Insurance Closed-Claim Databases (2005), http://
www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/medmal_042005.pdf [http://perma.cc/4LJSVQVH].
Reporting Medical Malpractice Payments, 45 C.F.R. § 60.7(a) (2013).
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. [hereinafter HHS], HEALTH RES.
AND SERVS. ADMIN., NPDB GUIDEBOOK A-5 (2015), http://www.npdb.
hrsa.gov/resources/aboutGuidebooks.jsp [http://perma.cc/5M7C-PMR8].
Id. at D-1.
Reporting Medical Malpractice Payments, 45 C.F.R. § 60.7(b) (2013).
U.S. Dep’t of Just. Bureau of Just. Stat., Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims
in Seven States, 2000-2004 (March 25, 2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf [http://perma.cc/CRW7-7MQJ].
HHS, supra note 120, at E-38.
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clinical competency,125 the data reported do not entail detailed clinical
records that would be of value in patient safety research.
Conclusion. Detailed information is developed in the course of
medical malpractice litigation, but little is accessible due to the broad
use of nondisclosure agreements in settlements and, occasionally, in
judicial sealing. Only limited access to closed malpractice insurance
claims exists, and claims present a narrow perspective since only about
3% of injured parties ever bring claims. The combination of these
factors means the legal system currently plays a minimally useful role
in revealing information that could be applied to the dire social
problem of medical harm.
IV. HOW MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION HAS REDUCED
PATIENT HARM
[T]he real problem is too much medical malpractice,
not too much litigation.126
–Tom Baker
A. The Health System Can Learn from Malpractice Litigation
The value of medical malpractice litigation to the health system
has been demonstrated in studies including some that transformed a
highly risky medical specialty. Researcher Joanna Schwartz studied
the influence of medical malpractice claims on the health system and
discovered malpractice lawsuits offer safety improvement benefits,
including:

125

126

HHS, HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., HEALTH LICENSING BOARD REPORT TO
CONGRESS, http://www.hrsa.gov/ruralhealth/about/telehealth/licenserpt10.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F2HR-FSSZ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) (report of Health
Resources and Services Administrator Mary K. Wakefield).
BAKER, supra note 85, at 3.
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1) Lawsuits reveal allegations of medical negligence and
related patient safety issues not revealed in hospital
reporting systems;
2) Previously unknown details of adverse events are exposed
in discovery and depositions;
3) Analysis of malpractice claim trends can identify
problematic procedures and hospital departments; and
4) Closed insurance claims are important teaching tools.127
The remedy for dangerous anesthesia care was malpractice
litigation. The history of anesthesia care provides a particularly
instructive illustration of how tort liability can motivate healthcare
providers to root out and correct safety problems in healthcare delivery
systems.128 The practice of anesthesia today is exceptionally safe but
that was not always so, and lessons from malpractice litigation sparked
the transformation. 129 From the 1950s into the 1980s, surgical
anesthesia put patients at risk of serious injury and death–and about
half the deaths were preventable. 130 The widespread harm from
anesthesia exposed anesthesiologists to a high likelihood of
malpractice lawsuits and they paid among the highest malpractice
insurance premiums. 131 In response to its malpractice fiasco, and
disturbing media reports surrounding it, the American Society of
Anesthesiologists launched studies in 1984 using malpractice claim
data.132
The anesthesia “Closed Claims Project” examined medical
malpractice insurance companies’ closed anesthesia malpractice
litigation files. 133 A typical file contained the hospital record,
127
128

129
130

131
132
133

Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1230-31.
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the
U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 893, 917 (2005).
Id. at 918.
Cheney, supra note 117, at 552 (describing how anesthesiologists were viewed
as bad insurance risks because they represented 3% of insured physicians, but
anesthesia litigation resulted in 11% of insurance payouts for patient injuries);
Hyman, supra note 128, at 918.
Hyman, supra note 128, at 918.
Cheney, supra note 117, at 552.
Id.
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anesthesia record, statements from personnel involved in the case,
expert statements, deposition summaries, and the settlement or jury
award. 134 The analysis was alarming: human error caused a large
number of the anesthesia injuries.135 In response, the American Society
of Anesthesiologists overhauled anesthesia practice by implementing
patient monitoring standards, redesigning care procedures, shortening
resident physicians’ hours on duty, standardizing equipment operation,
and requiring use of patient monitoring devices.136
The 25-year effort to make anesthesia safe for patients worked.
The risk of death from anesthesia dropped from 1 in 5000 anesthesia
administrations to 1 in 250,000.137 Less anesthetic harm meant fewer
lawsuits. As anesthesia malpractice litigation dissipated, anesthesia
providers’ malpractice insurance rates, once among the highest in
medicine, fell to among the lowest.138
It bears attention that the pressure to protect patients came from
outside the health system139 and the health system changed because of
malpractice litigation. 140 The anesthesia safety transformation
demonstrates a system feedback process. Serious anesthesia errors
harmed patients and generated lawsuits that in turn burdened
anesthesia providers with litigation costs and high malpractice
insurance premiums.141 Anesthesia practice changes led to lower error
rates, fewer lawsuits, lower malpractice premiums, and the recognition
of anesthesia as an exceptionally safe discipline.142
Other researchers have uncovered the value in examining
malpractice claims data. Dr. Thomas Glick, a Harvard Medical School
professor, published a study of malpractice claims against neurologists
and concluded that claims against physicians could educate them about
medical errors and thereby improve patient safety and the quality of
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Hyman, supra note 128, at 918.
Id. at 920.
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Hyman, supra note 128, at 920.
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396

UMass Law Review

v. 11 | 372

care.143 A primary care malpractice claims study had a similar finding.
The primary care researchers concluded that claims data identified
conditions where primary healthcare is prone to “go awry” 144 and
called the use of claims data “one of the richest opportunities for future
research and efforts to help good doctors prevent lapses in care.”145
V. OPTIONS FOR EXTRACTING MALPRACTICE DATA FROM THE
LEGAL SYSTEM TO ENHANCE PATIENT SAFETY EFFORTS
Those on the cutting edge of malpractice reform focus
on the 2 percent of mistakes that enter the court system,
in hopes of applying what they find to the 98 percent of
errors that quietly send tens of thousands of Americans
to the grave each year.146
—Dr. Darshak Sanghavi
A. Overview of Argument
Extracting data from medical malpractice insurance claims can
improve patient safety. The anesthesia studies demonstrated how data
from litigation can spur change in the health system that prevents
143

144

145
146

Thomas H. Glick, Malpractice Claims: Outcome Evidence to Guide Neurologic
Education?, 56 NEUROLOGY 1099, 1100 (2001). Despite Dr. Glick’s conclusion
that malpractice claims data offers a valuable learning opportunity for
neurologists, the journal Neurology also published an editorial undermining
Glick’s research findings. The editorial authors paid tribute to the “conventional
wisdom” that the legal system is the problem, not part of the solution to
addressing medical harm. The editorial authors stated, “to prevent and mitigate
the effects of medical error and to develop evidence-based programs to reduce
it, we need to collect, analyze, and understand very different data that those
found in medical malpractice claims filed by insurance carriers” and
“Unfortunately, one of the major reasons we know so little about the
epidemiology of medical near misses and errors is because of our current legal
system. The potential for litigation deters physicians and other care providers
from furnishing information that could reveal mistakes in the system, because
this information also could be used against them in a lawsuit.” Robert G.
Holloway & Robert J. Panzer, Lawyers, Litigation, and Liability: Can They
Make Patients Safer?, 56 NEUROLOGY 991, 992 (2001).
Robert L. Phillips et al., Learning from Malpractice Claims about Negligent,
Adverse Events in Primary Care in the United States, 13 QUAL. SAF. HEALTH
CARE 121, 121 (2004).
Id. at 126.
Sanghavi, supra note 111.

2016

Extracting Medical Injury Information

397

injuries and saves lives. And, Schwartz’ 2013 study identified how
litigation can reveal previously unknown patient safety problems.
The intractability of the medical injuries issue indicates resolution
will likely not take place solely by change initiated from within the
health system. Therefore, this Note argues that efforts to enhance
extraction of data from medical malpractice litigation can help shape
knowledge of medical injuries and thereby influence change. But the
ability to extract data, that will in turn provide feedback to the health
system, is dependent on the accessibility of that data.
Several strategies could increase access to patient data. First, the
increasing the flow of medical malpractice claiming would increase
the pool of data. When only about 3% of injured patients pursue a
claim, about 97% of the potential legal information about medical
injuries is inaccessible. Additionally, extracting data from confidential
records could reveal valuable data. Finally, greater access to medical
malpractice insurance claims could be used to improve patient safety
as it has in the past. The following sections explore these strategies for
enhancing access to data.
DATA IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Insurance Claims Data
Data in Out-of-Court
Settlements

THE
HEALTH
SYSTEM

Dormant Data in
Medical Injury
Cases Never
Litigated

Data in Sealed Court Records

FIGURE 1. Sources of medical injury data that could benefit
patient safety improvements in the health system.
B. To Harvest More Malpractice Data, Bring More
Malpractice Claims
Barriers to claiming. The barriers to bringing malpractice claims
are daunting and include access to justice, tort reform measures, and
the stress that accompanies litigation. To increase the volume of
medical malpractice claims, these barriers must be reduced. A major
barrier to increased claiming is access to the justice system. Many
patients who have experienced harm are unable to obtain legal
representation, and not having an attorney effectively means no
lawsuit.147 Medical malpractice lawsuits are expensive to litigate and
147

David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform: It’s
the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1117 (2006).
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studies show attorneys reject 70% to 90% of medical malpractice cases
they screen. 148 In a 2014 national study of attorneys, a researcher
determined that 95% of potential medical malpractice plaintiffs would
find it extremely difficult to locate an attorney willing to take on a case
unless expected damages are at least $250,000 (even when the case is
almost certain to win on the merits).149
High litigation costs mean attorneys refuse to represent patients
with “smaller” claims, and because the majority of medical negligence
events do not lead to serious harm, many patients are thus unable to
secure legal representation.150 Even claimants initially accepted by an
attorney may be dropped as information is developed—not because
there was no negligence but because damages appear insufficient to
proceed.151
Some states have implemented tort reform measures that make it
more difficult for claimants to bring medical malpractice claims.
Wisconsin is a case in point. Despite reports that medical errors are
increasing, Wisconsin malpractice lawsuits dropped 50% from 19992014. 152 Wisconsin lawmakers capped several types of damages
available in malpractice (as have about 34 other states). 153 Caps
limiting damage awards discourage lawyers from taking cases. 154
Wisconsin even caps fees lawyers can receive if successful in medical
malpractice cases. 155 A powerful physician’s lobby is credited with
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Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical
Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 167 (2014).
Id. at 151.
Id. at 174.
Hyman, supra note 147, at 1121.
Wisconsin Should Make Medical Malpractice Law Fairer, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, July 12, 2014, http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/wisconsinshould-make-medical-malpractice-law-fairer-b99309264z1-266823261.html
[http://perma.cc/WA6B-ZXUS].
Cary Spivak, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Plummet in Wisconsin,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 28, 2014, 5:00 PM, http://www.jsonline.
com/watchdog/watchdogreports/medical-malpractice-lawsuits-plummet-inwisconsin-b99290329z1-264436841.html [http://perma. cc/ZP5K-FH6A].
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exerting influence on the Wisconsin legislature to craft the malpractice
laws that favor physicians, not patients.156
At least thirty states have adopted medical malpractice laws,
reflecting a shift toward statutory control of medical malpractice
litigation and away from governance by court-made common law.157
These tort reforms include immunity provisions for healthcare
providers and institutions, notice requirements for plaintiffs, pretrial
screening to discourage cases without merit, prohibitions on ad
damnum clauses (the suggested dollar amounts a plaintiff requests a
court to award), collateral source rules requiring money damages be
offset by payments from sources such as health or disability insurance,
and limits on damages (as in Wisconsin).158 In jurisdictions that have
enacted medical malpractice tort reform to tighten compensation rules,
the measures do nothing to encourage quality improvement in the
health system.159
In all jurisdictions, there are practical considerations that dissuade
potential claimants from bringing a malpractice action. Patients
considering a claim may be sick or injured as a result of their
156

157

158
159

See generally Cary Spivak & Kevin Crowe, Medical Lobby is a Powerhouse in
Wisconsin Capitol, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 28, 2014, 5:00 PM,
http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/medical-lobby-is-apowerhouse-in-wisconsin-capitol-b99291106z1-265030841.html [http://perma.
cc/FY5V-4S4Z].
Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of State Tort Reforms on Physician Malpractice
Payments, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 500, 500-01 (2007).
Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 508. Powerful special interest groups have been involved in pressing for
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treatment160 and the system itself has been characterized as expensive,
burdensome, slow, and stingy.161 The average tried malpractice case
can last over three years.162
The process of civil litigation is stressful for plaintiffs.163 Justice
Learned Hand commented, “as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit
beyond almost anything short of sickness and death.” 164 And, even
when a patient can secure an attorney and withstand the stress of the
legal process, the odds are against plaintiffs who go to trial. Healthcare
provider-defendants win most malpractice jury trials. 165 Two
malpractice trial studies found defendants prevailed in 81% and 73%
of cases.166
Strategies to increase malpractice claiming and data
availability. Malpractice researcher Rogan Kersh observed, “Among
the few self-evident truths about the U.S. medical malpractice system
is that it desperately needs reforming.”167 There is no simple reform
that would encourage malpractice claiming and thereby create access
to dormant data. While medical malpractice reform measures have
been brandished, little political will to pursue comprehensive system
reform has been observed.168
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Overcoming the “malpractice myth.” A conventional wisdom
has infused many conversations about medical malpractice litigation
and has shaped policy initiatives such as tort reform that favors
healthcare providers and organizations. It’s been termed the
“malpractice myth” by insurance and medical malpractice expert Tom
Baker. 169 The myth espouses the view that there’s too much
malpractice litigation, most claims are frivolous, and undeserving
patients get unjustified damage awards (“jackpot justice”). 170 Other
facets of the myth are that malpractice insurance rates are driven up by
high rates of litigation, physicians are one malpractice verdict away
from bankruptcy, and physicians flee to states that have adopted
malpractice award damages caps.171 Medical malpractice researchers
Dr. David Hyman and attorney Charles Silver call these views
“mistaken and misleading.”172
The reality is that there is an epidemic of medical malpractice and
actually very little malpractice litigation. 173 Any “patient-centered”
public policy proposal aimed at increasing the volume of medical
malpractice claims would need to overcome the “malpractice myth.”
Policy change could only succeed if too much medical injury is
acknowledged as the primary problem, not too much medical
malpractice litigation.
Assuming the malpractice myth can be dispelled, policy options
that could streamline the litigation process, resolve more malpractice
claims and therefore generate more data, include the use of health
courts, mediation, arbitration, and administrative compensation boards.
These are briefly discussed here.
Health Courts. The concept of a “health court,” an administrative
entity that would process malpractice claims outside the tort system,

169

170
171

172
173

See BAKER, supra note 85. Tom Baker is William Maul Measey Professor of
Law and Health Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
previously directed the Insurance Law Institute at the University of Connecticut
School of Law, and is the author of publications including The Medical
Malpractice Myth published by the University of Chicago Press.
Shepherd, supra note 148, at 168.
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Five Myths of Medical Malpractice, 143
CHEST 222, 222 (2013).
Id.
BAKER, supra note 85 at 19.

402

UMass Law Review

v. 11 | 372

has been advanced by reform advocates.174 Specially qualified judges
would determine compensation decisions in what would arguably be a
faster, more reliable, more transparent process that would increase the
number of patients who recover. 175 However, health courts would
invite constitutional challenges because they would abrogate the
traditional role of the judiciary and the right to a trial by jury.176
Mediation. In mediation, an impartial third party works with
parties to resolve a dispute.177 It is a confidential, voluntary process
where the resolution is negotiated by the parties offers some
advantages over other dispute resolution processes.178 When used soon
after injury, parties can resolve claims promptly and the parties
themselves make decisions rather than having a resolution imposed on
them by an arbitrator or judge.179 Mediation provides cost savings by
shortening the litigation process and, in theory, information that
emerges could be used to improve patient care.180
Arbitration. A less complex version of litigation, arbitration
utilizes simplified rules of evidence and there is no discovery.181 Like
mediation, arbitration is less costly than litigation and offers more
flexibility than a trial. 182 Arbitration, unlike mediation, results in a
binding resolution that can be overturned only if malfeasance during
the arbitration process is shown.183
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No-Fault Administrative Compensation. One reform proposal
involves creating a malpractice resolution system modeled on
Workers’ Compensation that removes negligence as the eligibility
qualification.184 In one version of this model, an administrative body
would evaluate injury claims that are carved out of the tort system and
fast-tracked for compensation. 185 Claimants would not require legal
representation, and claims would be resolved by neutral adjudicators
and medical experts.186 Patients might receive compensation according
to a schedule for reasonable healthcare, rehabilitation expenses not
covered by insurance, and lost wages up to a maximum amount. 187
This process would replace a negligence determination with an
avoidability standard (whether a problem could have been avoided), a
more permissive standard than negligence that would result in a larger
pool of claimants eligible for compensation. 188 The U.S. has some
experience with this model. The Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program handles specified vaccine-related injuries, and two states use
administrative systems to resolve certain birth-related neurological
injuries.189
Repeal tort reforms that dissuade claims. Conventional tort
reforms aim to winnow the number of potential lawsuits as well as the
amount of damages awarded. 190 Most tort reforms will not improve
error reporting or health system safety and quality. 191 The most
frequently-discussed reforms (e.g., damage caps, credits for collateral
source payments, and contingency fee limits) are targeted at reducing
insurance costs—not improving unsafe care or reducing medical
errors. 192 Repealing any of these conventional tort reform measures
would likely enhance litigation volume.
In summary, these options could remove barriers to malpractice
claims so patients with legitimate medical injury cases would enjoy
improved access to justice. This, in turn, would create records
184
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documenting medical malpractice cases, and that would add data to the
pool of knowledge about medical injuries. These strategies could open
the doors to the justice system for some of the 97% of injured patients
who never bring a malpractice claim.
However, increasing the volume of litigation has major
implications for an already stressed justice system. For example,
across the nation, federal district courts have experienced a rise in
recent years in the time required to get civil cases to trial as judges’
workloads have increased.193 Chief District Judge Fred Biery of the
Western District of Texas remarked, “It would be nice to get some
help. We are pedaling as fast as we can on an increasingly rickety
bicycle.” 194 Additional resources would be essential to manage any
increase in malpractice litigation in the courts. The political
complexities of enacting “patient-centered” change would require
overcoming the “malpractice myth” as well as powerful interest
groups. (A full discussion of the complexities of interest group politics
is beyond the scope of this Note.)
C. Reduce Secrecy in Settlements and Litigation to Improve
Access to Data
Civil litigation has the power to uncover otherwise hidden
information about practices that result in injury.195 But common legal
practices such as protective orders, sealing orders, and confidential
settlements deprive the public of information that might be helpful in
preventing such injuries and deaths.196
Public health refers to measures to prevent disease, promote health,
and prolong life in a population as a whole. 197 A main function of
193
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public health is formulating public policies designed to solve identified
local and national health problems.198 Medical errors were labeled a
serious public health problem as early as 2001.199 This Note argues
that, when considering approaches to increasing access to medical
malpractice data, medical injuries in the U.S. should be viewed as a
public health and safety hazard demanding a policy response.
Advocates of public access to information argue that secrecy covers up
unexposed danger, that the public has a right to information
concerning a public risk, and that private parties’ rights to
confidentiality should be subordinated to public safety. 200
Additionally, they contend that if disclosure allows the justice system
to better protect and serve the public by, for example warning of
harms, then secrecy must be minimized.201
Anti-secrecy advocates also argue that suppressing information
about dangers inherent in corporate behavior in healthcare deprives
regulators, other litigants, and consumers of important safety
information.202 Certain factors weigh in favor of public disclosure such
as when a high degree of harm or a risk of death is involved, a high
likelihood that unknown third parties will be harmed, and when the
secret settlement will conceal a harm from others.203
Recent legislative initiatives aimed at increasing “sunshine” by
prohibiting or reducing secret settlements of civil lawsuits demonstrate
the public’s discomfort with confidential settlements. 204 Several
approaches to increase transparency in the resolution of claims
include:
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1) Adopting a presumption all court records are open to the
public;
2) Limiting use of protective orders in discovery;
3) Requiring a party to show good cause before sealing court
files;
4) Requiring a public hearing before sealing a court file;
5) Forbidding secret settlements in court; and
6) Making confidentiality agreements void as against public
policy if the agreement conceals a public hazard.205
Several states and one court in particular have instituted sunshine
rules that merit consideration in a discussion of how to increase access
to medical injury data.206
Texas Rule 76a. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a, adopted in
1990, presumes all court records including settlements are open to the
public and may only be sealed upon specific showing.207 Rule 76a lays
out a test a party seeking to seal a record must satisfy.
First, the party seeking sealing must identify “a specific, serious,
and substantial interest which clearly outweighs (1) this presumption
of openness, and (2) any probably adverse effect that sealing will have
upon the general public health or safety.” 208 Additionally, the party
must show that “no less restrictive means than sealing records will
adequately and effectively protect the specific interest asserted.”209 A
court must balance the interest of the party seeking secrecy against the
public interest.210
Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act. The Florida Sunshine in
Litigation Act was adopted in 1990 and goes farther than the Texas
rule by “preemptively prohibiting, without any balancing of private
and public interests, the sealing of any information that has the
purpose of concealing a public hazard or contains information that
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would be useful in protecting oneself from a public hazard.”211 The
law defines a public hazard broadly as “any . . . instrumentality that
has caused and is likely to cause injury.”212 Thus, this broad statute
may encroach on personal privacy.213
South Carolina District Court’s secrecy ban. The nation’s
strictest secrecy ban is the South Carolina District Court’s Local Civil
Rule 5.03(e) that prohibits any settlement agreement filed with the
court to be sealed. 214 South Carolina’s federal trial judges voted
unanimously to ban secret settlements because such agreements “made
the courts complicit in hiding the truth about hazardous products, inept
doctors, and sexually abusive priests.”215 However, private agreements
made out of court can still freely suppress information about dangers
to public safety.216
New Jersey’s medical malpractice law. New Jersey adopted an
anti-secrecy rule that applies specifically to medical malpractice
information, whether generated through judicial action or private
settlement. 217 The 2003 law requires any information about a
malpractice award to be posted on the defendant’s internet profile—
but without any balancing of interests including privacy.218
Recommendations. While the concept of greater transparency in
tort actions is simple, making it happen is complicated.219 The public’s
interest in information must be balanced by privacy protections and
ensuring that courts remain efficient forums in which to resolve
disputes. 220 Though this Note argues enhanced transparency is
desirable in providing access to medical injury data, matters of private
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interest that do not threaten public health or safety, or conceal a public
hazard, should always be exempt from disclosure.221
For cases resolved via the courts, there are viable public policy
options that could increase transparency. Senator Herbert Kohl
introduced a “Sunshine in Litigation” bill multiple times during the
course of his 24 years in the U.S. Senate.222 The legislation, if it had
passed, would have applied to protective orders and sealing of cases
and settlements. 223 The bill’s language required judges to use a
balancing test to weigh the need for secrecy against the potential for
harm to the public, and to make specific factual findings before
entering a confidentiality order.224 A challenge in enacting a fair antisecrecy law is that confidentiality determinations would require
painstaking case-by-case analysis.225 However, “weighing competing
interests is what judges do on a daily basis.”226 Federal action though
seems unlikely, thus states could follow in Texas’s balancing test
regulation to increase transparency.
Greater access to privately-negotiated out-of-court settlements that
are protected with nondisclosure agreements is not likely. However,
payment in these settlements must be reported by the insurer to the
National Practitioner Databank. If the data elements were expanded
there would be additional information available to patient safety
researchers.
D. Increase Access to Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims
Data
The anesthesia closed claims study demonstrated the value of
using insurance data to influence the health system. But most
researchers have been unable to gain access to closed claims records
except limited information provided to state insurance departments in
Florida, Texas, and Missouri. 227 As long as access to liability
221
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insurance data relies on the insurer’s discretion, the information
provided will likely be incomplete, and may be biased to favor the
public policy agenda of the insurance carrier.228
The presently private nature of malpractice claims could be
brought more fully into public view, though that is unlikely without
government action.229 The Insurance Research Council (IRC) collects
extensive data on motor vehicle claims from insurers and publishes
large data-sets every three to five years. 230 Each participating
automobile insurer provides individual claims-level data creating a
pool of about 80,000 claims.231 Mandatory reporting of de-identified
medical malpractice claims data to the Insurance Research Council or
other appropriate agency could significantly enhance the quantity and
quality of medical injury claims data now available. Congressional
action would be required to enact this policy but would garner data far
beyond what is now accessible.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and
unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far
outweighs the dangers which are cited to justify it.232
–John. F. Kennedy
The extent of medical errors, injuries, and negligence in the United
States health system should shock the conscience of anyone made
aware. While tribute must be paid to those who have contributed to
patient safety improvements, the intractability of the problem demands
new strategies be added to tools currently used. Solutions will not be
effective unless they are firmly rooted in valid and reliable data. Thus,
this Note has argued that it’s time for the health system to look to rich
sources of data within the legal system.
The anesthesia closed claims studies transformed a risky medical
specialty into a safe one, demonstrating the powerful influence
research using closed medical malpractice insurance claims can have
on a problem-riddled system. Mandating that medical malpractice
insurers report detailed, de-identified data to a third party collection
agency is likely the most achievable of the recommendations proposed
in this Note. However, even if access were provided to data from every
closed malpractice claim, the sample size would be only three percent
of the entire universe of patients who experience some type of medical
harm.
Secrecy in litigation can hide harm from the public. Although court
records documented the dangers associated with the fatal marriage of
Firestone tires and Ford Explorers, 271 deaths and over 800 serious
injuries occurred before unsealed court documents revealed the
danger. 233 The Florida and New Jersey approaches to medical
malpractice that demand full “sunshine” are a step too far though.
Patients must have the option to preserve their privacy if they so
choose. But Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a provides an exemplar
for other jurisdictions to consider. The rule presumes openness in
232
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judicial records but permits sealing if a party can show that sealing
will have no adverse effect on public health and safety.
A bigger malpractice litigation pipeline could foster real change in
the health system (and provide compensation to many who are harmed
but have no access to justice in the current system). Effective pressure
for safer hospital culture is most likely to develop from an increased
risk of liability – stimulated by an increase in patient safety lawsuits.234
Medical malpractice tort reform has been legislated on behalf of
special interest groups – not on behalf of patients who have
experienced medical injury. Patient-centered tort reform could erode
barriers to bringing claims that now exist. Notwithstanding the need
for better access the medical injury data, patients who experience harm
deserve better access to justice than exists now. But to handle a larger
volume of cases, more resources would be essential.
Policy change is unlikely to address any patient-centered medical
malpractice issue until the “malpractice myth” is exposed and
discarded. The entrenched myth, resting on such misconceptions as
patients winning undeserved “jackpot justice,” is widely accepted
despite resting on a wobbly factual foundation.
Public access to litigation-generated information permits citizens
to observe and participate in the judicial system and gain confidence
that courts serve public, as well as private, interests. 235 Enhancing
access to medical malpractice data is a logical role for the tort system
because of the intractability of the medical injury problem. The tort
system’s social utility function requires that it work toward the good of
society, and the medical negligence problem infesting the health
system demands action.
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